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We model the opacity of over-the-counter (OTC) markets in a setup where agents share risks, but have
incentives to default and their financial positions are not mutually observable. We show that this setup
results in excess "leverage" in that parties take on short OTC positions that lead to levels of default
risk that are higher than Pareto-efficient ones. In particular, OTC markets feature a "counterparty risk
externality" that we show can lead to ex-ante productive inefficiency. This externality is absent when
trading is organized via a centralized clearing mechanism that provides transparency of trade positions,
or a centralized counterparty (such as an exchange) that observes all trades and sets prices competitively.
While collateral requirements and subordination of OTC positions in bankruptcy can ameliorate the
counterparty risk externality, they are in general inadequate in addressing it fully.
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alberto.bisin@nyu.edu``To restrain private people, it may be said, from receiving in
payment the promissory notes of a banker for any sum, whether
great or small, when they themselves are willing to receive them;
or, to restrain a banker from issuing such notes, when all his
neighbours are willing to accept of them, is a manifest violation
of that natural liberty, which it is the proper business of law not
to infringe, but to support. Such regulations may, no doubt, be
considered as in some respects a violation of natural liberty. But
those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which
might endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought
to be, restrained by the laws of all governments; of the most free,
as well as of the most despotical. The obligation of building party
walls, in order to prevent the communication of re, is a violation
of natural liberty, exactly of the same kind with the regulations of
the banking trade which are here proposed." { Adam Smith, The
Wealth of Nations, 1776.1
1 Introduction and motivation
An important risk that needs to be evaluated at the time of nancial con-
tracting is the risk that a counterparty will not fulll its future obligations.
This counterparty risk is dicult to evaluate because the exposure of the
counterparty to various risks is generally not public information. Contrac-
tual terms such as prices and collateral that aect a trade can be tailored
to mitigate counterparty risk, but the extent to which this can be achieved,
and how eciently so, depends in general on how contracts are traded.
One possible trading infrastructure is an over-the-counter (OTC) market
in which each party trades with another, subject to a bankruptcy code that
determines how counterparty defaults will be resolved.2 A key feature of OTC
markets is their opacity. In particular, even within a set of specic contracts,
for example, credit default swaps (CDS), no trading party has full knowledge
of positions of others. We show theoretically that such opacity of exposures
1The paragraph cited appears on Vol. 1, p. 289, of the J.M. Dent & Sons Publisher
edition, London, 1910.
2The contract may adhere to a uniformly applicable corporate bankruptcy code, or
when the contract is exempt from the code, the bankruptcy outcome may be specied in
the contract.
1in OTC markets leads to an important risk spillover { a counterparty risk
externality3 { that leads to excessive \leverage" in the form of short positions
that collect premium upfront but default ex post. Such excessive leverage
results in inecient levels of risk-sharing, deadweight costs of bankruptcy,
and productive ineciency.
Counterparty risk externality is the eect that the default risk on one con-
tract will be increased if the counterparty agrees to the same contract with
another agent because the second contract increases the probability that the
counterparty will be unable to perform on the rst one. Put simply, the
default risk on one deal depends on what else is being done. The intuition
for our result concerning the ineciency of OTC markets is that in OTC
markets it is not at all transparent what else is being done. Hence, counter-
parties cannot charge price schedules that eectively penalize the creation of
counterparty risk. This makes it likely that excessively large short positions
will be built by some institutions without other market participants being
able to discourage them through pricing or risk controls for these institutions.
For example, in September 2008, it became known that A.I.G.'s liquidity
position was inadequate given that it had written credit default swaps (be-
spoke CDS) for many investors guaranteeing protection against default on
mortgage-backed products. Each investor realized that the value of A.I.G.'s
protection was dramatically reduced on its individual guarantee. Investors
demanded increased collateral { essentially posting of extra cash { which
A.I.G. was unable to provide and the Treasury had to take over A.I.G. The
counterparty risks were so widespread globally that a default would proba-
bly have spurred many other defaults, generating a downward spiral. The
A.I.G. example illustrates the cost that large OTC exposures can impose on
the system when a large institution defaults on its obligations. But, more
importantly, it also raises the question of whether A.I.G.'s true risk as a
counterparty was subject to adequate risk controls in protections they sold.
We argue that the opacity of the OTC markets in which these credit deriva-
tives traded was at least in part responsible for allowing the build-up of such
large exposures in the rst place.4
3The term \counterparty risk externality" is as employed by Acharya and Engle (2009).
A part of the discussion below, especially related to A.I.G. is also based on that article.
4Traditionally, in economics, we have considered the moral hazard problem of insurance
as being with respect to the hidden action of the insured party. In this paper, and as the
A.I.G. example illustrates, the problem is ipped and the moral hazard is with respect to
the hidden action (trades, contracts, etc.) of the insurer.
2A number of nancial innovations in xed income, foreign exchange, and
credit markets have traded until now in OTC markets, the (gross) global no-
tional outstanding of such derivatives being close to $500 trillion in December
2009, as per the Global Financial Stability Report of the IMF (April 2010). In
contrast, many derivative products linked to commodity and equities have
traded successfully on centralized trading platforms such as exchanges. A
distinguishing feature of an exchange relative to OTC trading is that even
though individual agents still do not see each others' trades, there is a cen-
tralized counterparty { the exchange { that sees all trades (at least on all
products traded on that particular exchange). This enables the exchange
to oer individual parties pricing schedules for trades (in practice, collateral
arrangements and exposure limits) that are contingent not just on observable
or public characteristics (e.g., credit ratings) but also on its own knowledge
of other trades (e.g., net positions in futures contracts). However, exchanges
are often viewed as detrimental to the ease of search facilitated by bilat-
eral OTC markets, especially for customized or non-standardized nancial
products. Hence, as an alternative to intermediating trades on a centralized
platform or through a centralized counterparty, a centralized clearing mech-
anism has been proposed that registers all trades in OTC markets and then
serves as a data repository providing transparency of these trades.
We show formally that when trading is organized in the form of a cen-
tralized clearing mechanism, transparency can enable market participants to
condition contract terms for each counterparty based on its overall positions.
Such conditioning is sucient to get that party to internalize the counter-
party risk externality of its trades achieve the ecient risk-sharing outcome.
In other words, the moral hazard that a party wants to take on excessive
leverage through short positions { collect premiums today and default to-
morrow { is counteracted by the fact that they face a steeper price schedule
by so doing. We show that a competitive centralized exchange or a central-
ized counterparty also would induce ecient risk-sharing, but in practice,
this would be at the cost of restricting all trades, including those involving
non-standardized nancial assets, through a single intermediary.
1.1 Model and results
We derive these results in a competitive two-period general equilibrium (GE)
model which allows for the possibility of default (Geanakoplos, 1997, Geanako-
plos and Zame, 1998, Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik, 2005). There is a
3single nancial asset, which can be interpreted as a contingent claim on fu-
ture states of the world, and agents can take long or short positions in the
asset. Trades are backed by agents' endowments. When an agent has short
positions that cannot be met by the pledgeable fraction of endowment, there
is default. Default results in deadweight costs which are borne by the short
position and are increasing in the size of short positions, e.g., due to a greater
number of parties to deal with in a bankruptcy proceeding. Such costs may
arise also due to loss of customers or franchise value in fully dynamic setups.
We do not model the structure of bankruptcy costs but simply postulate
their pecuniary equivalent in reduced form.
The possibility of default (the option to exercise limited liability, to be
precise) implies that long and short positions do not necessarily yield the
same payo and indeed that there is counterparty risk in trading. We assume
a natural bankruptcy rule that illustrates why counterparty risk potentially
arises in such a setting. In particular, in any given state of the world, the
payo to long positions is determined pro-rata based on delivery from short
positions. This rationing of payments implies that each trade imposes a
payo externality on other trades. This spillover is precisely what we refer
to as a counterparty risk externality.
In this setup, we consider various trading structures and ask whether
they can internalize the counterparty risk externality or whether they lead
instead to inecient risk-sharing. One structure, a centralized clearing mech-
anism with transparency, guarantees that all trades are observable and agents
can set pricing schedules that are conditional on this knowledge. Another
structure, a centralized exchange or a centralized counterparty, observes all
trades and can set pricing schedules based on this knowledge. In contrast,
in economies with OTC market structure, trades are not mutually observed
and thus pricing schedules faced by agents are not conditional on their other
trades (even though they might be conditioned on public information about
their type, e.g., their level of endowment).
Our rst result is that competitive equilibria in economies with a transpar-
ent centralized clearing mechanism or a centralized exchange are constrained
Pareto ecient. This is true even allowing for market incompleteness so that
the result is not simply a consequence of welfare theorems in case of complete
markets. Our second result is that competitive equilibria in economies with
OTC markets are robustly constrained inecient.5
5We study two dierent cases, one in which OTC markets operate with a bilateral
4The ineciency in the OTC setting manifests as excessively large short
positions as counterparties taking long positions do not internalize the default
risk they impose on other long positions. Intuitively, as long as there is a \risk
premium" on the underlying contract (e.g., because the risk being insured
in the contract is aggregate in nature) and the costs of defaulting are not
excessively large, the short position (the insurer) perceives a benet from col-
lecting premiums upfront and defaulting ex post. We interpret this outcome
as characterizing excessive \leverage".6 Formally, we capture the resulting
ineciency in the form of deadweight costs of bankruptcy. More generally,
the ineciency could manifest as excessive systemic risk due to spillover on
to other counterparties. Furthermore, in an extension, we clarify that the in-
eciency of OTC markets extends beyond just inecient risk-sharing. When
we allow agents to alter their production schedules, the ability to hedge the
production risk through nancial contracts creates additional demand for
long positions and the incentives to build excessive leverage through short
OTC positions markets translate into a production ineciency.7
In another extension, we consider the role of bilateral collateral arrange-
ments in addressing the counterparty risk externality. We show that since
bilateral arrangements cannot be conditioned on information about all other
trades of counterparties, in general, they do not deliver constrained eciency
of equilibrium outcomes. In particular, there are economies in which a suf-
ciently \tight" collateral arrangement can preclude any default by a coun-
terparty. This level of default risk may or may not be optimal. But even
netting mechanism and one without bilateral netting. We show that OTC markets are
robustly constrained inecient in both cases. In other words, the counterparty risk ex-
ternality is orthogonal to what could be called the \netting externality" { that default
decision of one party depends on the default decision of its counterparties. This makes
it precise that it is the opacity or lack of transparency of positions in the OTC markets
(rather than dierences with centralized trading in how bankruptcy is resolved) that leads
to ex-ante ineciency.
6Interestingly, this implies a lower unit cost of insurance since the realized insurance
payo is smaller when the insurer is more likely to default.
7As an example, suppose that there is insurance being provided on economy-wide mort-
gage defaults. This would carry a signicant hedging premium due to demand from mort-
gage lenders, giving rise to perverse insurer incentives to default. Thus, in equilibrium, the
insurer would take on large and inadequately-collateralized short-selling (of protection) on
pools of mortgages and the insured lenders would feed the excessive creation of the housing
stock backing such mortgages. This may be a partial explanation of the role played by
credit default swaps, sold in large quantities by A.I.G. on corporate loan and mortgage
pools, in fueling the credit boom preceding the crisis of 2007-09.
5when it is optimal, the required collateral can alter productive eciency of
the economy by resulting in over-investment in the collateral assets, or alter-
nately, if the collateral asset is limited in quantity, ensuring no default can
induce too little risk-sharing.
Finally, we examine whether subordinating OTC positions in bankruptcy
relative to centrally cleared ones (when both OTC and centralized markets
co-exist) can eliminate counterparty risk externality. We show that in general
this is not the case. On the one hand, conditioned on default, the size of OTC
positions does not aect the payo on centrally cleared positions. This limits
the externality from OTC positions to centrally cleared ones. On the other
hand, counterparty risk externality in OTC markets remains unaddressed.
As a result, there may now be default in states of the world where there
would be none under centrally cleared markets. Due to deadweight costs of
default, this lowers the payo on centrally cleared positions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
a simple example of the counterparty risk externality in OTC markets. Sec-
tion 3 presents the general model, the various trading structures (OTC and
centralized clearing with transparency), and the welfare analysis of competi-
tive equilibrium under these structures. Section 4 discusses extensions of the
model. Section 5 discusses the relationship between the competitive equilib-
rium in our model and the market microstructure of OTC and centralized
trading structures in practice. This section also considers the policy impli-
cations of our model for OTC versus centralized clearing. Section 6 relates
our work to existing literature. Section 7 concludes. The analysis of trading
with a centralized exchange or counterparty structure is in the Appendix,
which also contains proofs.
2 Counterparty risk externality: An example
Consider a two-period (t = 0;1) competitive economy with three types of
agents (i = 1;2;3). There are two states of the world at t = 1, denoted by
Good (G) and Bad (B). The probabilities of these states are p and (1   p),
respectively. Agents' endowments in the two states are denoted as wi(s),
i = 1;2;3, and s = G;B. Their initial endowments are denoted wi
0. We
assume that initial endowments are large enough that there are no default








2(B) = 0 < w
3(B):
In other words, agents of type 1 and type 2 have endowment in the good state
of the economy, but none in the bad state; agents of type 3 are endowed in
the bad state but not in the good state.
Agents of each type have a mean-variance utility function:




where x0 is the residual endowment at t = 0, and x(s) is the realized endow-
ment at t = 1, both taking account of trades that are structured at t = 0
and materialize at t = 1.
We assume that the only traded contract is an \insurance" that resembles
a put option on the bad state of the economy. The contractual payo of the
contract is R(G) = 0 and R(B) > 0. For simplicity, we will refer to R(B)
simply as R. Importantly, the economy will allow for default so that the
actual payo on the contract in the bad state may be less than R. The
insurance contract must be paid for at t = 0 and we denote its price as q.
To highlight our main point, we consider agents 1 and 2 purchasing in-
surance contract from agents 3.8 We denote the long positions of agents 1
and 2 as zi  0, i = 1;2, and the short position of agents 3 as z3  0. Note
that the only agents that can default given our assumptions are agents 3. We
assume that in case they default, they suer a linear non-pecuniary penalty
as a function of the positions defaulted upon, whose pecuniary equivalent in
the bad state is given by z3. Broadly speaking, this penalty can be inter-
preted as loss of continuation (or franchise) value in a multi-period setting.
Hence, the equilibrium cash ow of agents 3 will be negative in the bad state
if they default, reecting this deadweight cost.
2.1 OTC markets
We consider the case of over-the-counter (OTC) trading: agents do not ob-
serve the size of the trades put on by other agents and hence prices cannot
be conditioned on these. In other words, all agents take the price per unit of
8It would suce to simply consider in this example economy two types of agents.
Nevertheless, for sake of clearer exposition of counterparty risk externality, we consider
three types of agents.
7insurance as a given constant (and not a schedule depending on total insur-
ance sold by agents 3 in the economy). Agents are fully rational, however,
and anticipate correctly the likelihood of default, and its consequent eect on
the realized payo on the insurance contract (R+) relative to the promised





































where 1D is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one if there is
default (R+ < R) and zero otherwise. Equivalently, we will show below that
x3(B) = max(w3(B)   Rz3; z3).
Then, equilibrium in the economy is characterized by the trading po-
sitions, the payo on the insurance contract (involving the possibility of
default), and the cost of insurance, denoted as (z1;z2;z3;R+;q), such that:
1. Each agent maximizes its expected utility by choosing its trade posi-
tions (as we describe below);
2. Market for insurance clears: z3 = z1 + z2; and,
3. In case of default, (we assume that) there is pro-rata sharing of agents




z1+z2 if 1D = 1
R else













































In other words, all else equal, agents 1 and 2 purchase more insurance
if they have greater endowment in the good state and less so if the cost of
insurance rises. The crucial observation is that even though the payo R+ is
aected by each agent's long position in equilibrium, agents are competitive
and do not internalize this eect. This is the source of counterparty risk
externality in the model. In a GE model without default, R+ is guaranteed
to be R so that the externality would not arise.
Next, we will show that agents of type 3 have incentives to default in
state B whenever the parameter governing the deadweight cost of default, ",
is not too high. To clarify agent 3's choice with regard to default, consider


























In the limit where there are no default costs, that is,  = 0, agent 3 with
position z3





which turns out to be equivalent to requiring that q  (1   p)R. This
condition has the intuitive interpretation that the insurer has incentives not
to default ex post only if the price of insurance is smaller than or equal to
the expected payo on the insurance, or in other words, that there is no \risk
premium" in the insurance price. This will, however, not hold in equilibrium
in general, whenever the insurance is against a risk that is aggregate in nature
and cannot be fully diversied away, e.g., if w1(G) + w2(G) > w3(B).9
9A large component of default risk is driven by macroeconomic risks. This explains
why there is the moral hazard of default on part of insurers selling credit default swaps
(CDS): CDS eectively insure at least some portion of aggregate risk contained in the
default risk of the underlying entity. In contrast, there is less risk of such a moral hazard
on the part of insurers selling traditional insurance products such as policies on death,
accidents, etc. These risks are easily diversied away across agents in the economy, so
that insurers simply earn the actuarially fair premium, or in other words, do not earn a
signicant risk premium.
9Consider then the problem of agent 3; the insurer, when we explicitly











Clearly, the insurer pledges the entire endowment in the bad state at t = 1
in order to collect as much insurance premium as possible at t = 0.10 Thus,
from the rst-order condition, we obtain that
z
3 =
q   (1   p)
p(1   p)2 : (4)
Thus, the lower the cost of default  and greater the price of insurance q, the
greater is the quantity of insurance supplied by the insurers.
Substituting for (z1;z2;z3) in the market-clearing and bankruptcy condi-
tions of the equilibrium yields two equations in the realized insurance payo














p(1   p)R+: (6)
To get intuition, we dene as \risk premium":
p =
q
R+   (1   p); (7)
which is, the dierence between the \risk-neutral" probability of state B and
its actual or statistical probability. Then, solving the system in p and R+












implying there is a risk premium whenever agents are risk-averse ( > 0),
there is risk (0 < p < 1), and this risk cannot be diversied away across
10Note that the no-default condition now takes the form:
w3(B)  (R   )z3:
10agents (w1(G) + w2(G) > w3(B)), and
R
+ =
(1   p)" +
p
(1   p)2"2 + 4w3(B)p(1   p)[p + (1   p)]"2
2[p + (1   p)]
(9)
which is increasing in ". In other words, the higher the bankruptcy costs,
the lower is the equilibrium default rate on the contract. It follows then that
the contract price q = [p + (1   p)]R+ is also increasing in ". In turn,
there is default in equilibrium (R+ < R) if and only if bankruptcy costs are
suciently small (" smaller than some threshold level ").
2.2 Numerical example
We parametrize the above economy with w1(G) = 10, w2(G) = 5, and
w3(B) = 10 so that state B is aggregate risky in nature. We set  = 1,
p = 0:9 and vary  in the range [0:1;1:0] (a subset of the entire possible range
 > 0). Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot respectively the equilibrium quantity of in-
surance sold (z3), its realized payo (R+), and its price (q), all as a function
of , the proportional deadweight cost of default.
There is a critical value of  below which defaults take place and this
value is around 0:548. Above this value, there is no default. Interestingly,
for all  smaller than this threshold value, the equilibrium is eectively the
same as far as risk-sharing is concerned: agents of type 3 transfer all their
endowment in the bad state at t = 1 to agents 1 and 2. To be precise,
the equilibrium utilities (relative to t = 0 endowments) are (U1;U2;U3) =
( 1:97; 0:84;1:35) regardless of  in the default range. However, this is not
true of the equilibrium quantity of insurance contracts sold and the unit price
of insurance.
For example, when  = 0:5, the quantities traded are (z1;z2) = (8:22;2:74)
with z3 = z1 + z2; there is 9% default on the contract (R+ = 0:91); and,
insurance price is q = 0:30. In turn, the risk premium p equals 0:23.
In contrast, with  = 0:01, the quantities traded become much larger:
(z1;z2) = (410:95;136:98); there is 98% default on the contract (R+ = 0:02);
and, insurance price is much lower at q = 0:0067.
To summarize, as the default incentives for agents of type 3 become
stronger, there is greater quantity of insurance sold, greater default, and
greater deadweight costs suered by these agents. In turn, the equilibrium
insurance price is smaller too. Since the payo on the contract is rationally
11anticipated by those purchasing insurance to be smaller: the quality of in-
surance has gone down given the insurer's default risk. Interestingly, there is
no eect of default risk on the risk premium, which is constant and is given
by equation (8).
2.3 Ineciency of OTC markets
The ineciency of equilibrium in the example above when " < 0:548 stems
from excessive deadweight costs of agent 3's bankruptcy. This can be seen in
Figure 4 which plots the sum of utilities of all three agents and also separately
of agents of type 3. Agents 1 and 2 enjoy the same equilibrium utility as 
varies. However, for  < 0:548, default leads to deadweight costs borne by
agents of type 3 and their equilibrium utility is substantially lower compared
to the case where   0:548. The result of counterparty risk externality
is that there is too much demand for insurance in equilibrium, which gives
insurers the incentive to default ex post, for which they pay ex ante.
It is clear then that in the example the planner can improve upon the OTC
case when  is smaller than 0:548. Essentially, the planner needs to enforce
a \position limit" that restricts agents of type 3 from selling a quantity of
insurance z3 that is beyond their endowment in the bad state w3(B). One
way in which this position limit can be implemented is through a non-linear
pricing schedule: q(z3) = 0 if z3 > w3(B), and q(z3) determined by the
markets otherwise. While in this example, it is ecient for insurance to be
fully collateralized so that any default is ruled out in equilibrium, this is in
general not true. What is however true, and we show below, is that the OTC
markets always feature (weakly) greater likelihood of default in equilibrium
compared to its (Pareto) ecient level.
3 The general model
We now build on the above example to construct a general model of an OTC
market with default risk. In particular, we allow for an arbitrary number of
agent types, with arbitrary structure of endowments, and the possibility of
each of the agents taking long and short positions with each other (requir-
ing us to also introduce some additional notation). Without much further
complication, we also allow only a part of each agent's endowment to be
pledgeable in honoring its short positions. Deadweight costs of bankruptcy
12could be interpreted as (partly) arising from loss of the non-pledgeable en-
dowment. For sake of simplicity, we continue to restrict attention to a single
nancial contract. After completing the analysis of OTC markets, we con-
sider nancial markets with a centralized clearing mechanism that provides
transparency and compare its equilibrium outcome with that under the OTC
markets.
Formally, we extend the two-period General Equilibrium (GE) exchange
economy with default (Geanakoplos, 1997, Geanakoplos and Zame, 1998,
Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik, 2005) to allow for dierent mechanisms
for nancial market trading. In the interest of pedagogical clarity, we state
the optimization programs in each setting fully even though some parts are
common across dierent programs.
Agents and endowments The economy is populated by i = 1;:::;I types
of agents. Let xi
0 be consumption of agent i at time 0. Let s = 1;:::;S denote
the states of uncertainty in the economy, which are realized at time 1: State
s occurs with probability ps; and
P
s
ps = 1. Let xi
1 be agent i's consumption
at time 1, a random variable over the state space S: xi
1(s); for s 2 S. Let wi
0
be the endowment of agent i at time 0; and wi
1(s) her endowment at time 1
in state s . The utility of agent i over consumption in state s is denoted as
ui(xi
0;xi
1(s)) and belongs to the von-Neumann Morgenstern class of expected
utility functions.
Financial markets and default We assume, for simplicity, that only one
nancial asset is traded in this economy, an asset whose payo is an exoge-
nous non-negative S-dimensional vector R: We can imagine it representing a
derivative contract, e.g., a credit default swap.
Agents selling the asset might default on their required payments. In
particular, agent i's short positions are eectively backed by the pledgeable
fraction  of her endowment at time 1. In other words, in the event of de-
fault, creditors (counterparties holding long positions on the asset with the
defaulting party) have recourse only to a fraction  2 [0;1] of agent i's en-
dowment wi
1(s): Other than the defaulting agent simply losing her pledgeable
endowment to counterparties, default is assumed to have a direct deadweight
cost that is proportional to the size of the position defaulted upon. Dead-
weight costs of default will serve the formally convenient purpose of providing
a bound on short positions on the asset.
13Agents are assumed to trade bilaterally in nancial markets. Even though
one single asset is traded ex ante, the asset pay-o ex post depends on the
type of the agent shorting it, as that agent's default decision also depends
on the type. Let z
ij
+ be long positions of agents of type i sold by agents of







j2I denote the long portfolio vector of agents of type i
(with zii
+ = 0; by construction). Let zi
  be the short position of agents of type
i. As we will explain shortly, all short positions are symmetric for the agents
shorting the asset, independently of the counterparty, so that there is no
need to index short positions of an agent by the counterparty. Then, in case
of its default, agent i suers a deadweight cost of default whose pecuniary
equivalent is assumed to be "zi
 , with " > 0.
3.1 OTC markets
Consider rst the case in which trading is intermediated in over-the-counter
(OTC) markets. We model OTC markets as standard competitive mar-
kets with no centralized clearing or centralized counterparty (such as an
exchange). We assume that no creditor has privileged recourse to a debtor's
endowment in case of default. Nonetheless, a bankruptcy mechanism oper-
ates to distribute the cash ow delivered on the short positions (full cash
ow or endowment recovered in case of default) pro-rata amongst the long
positions. To be precise, consider an agent of type i shorting the asset. At
equilibrium, the total repayment cash ow from an agent of type i is dis-
tributed pro-rata among the holders of long positions against counterparty
i.11
The default condition An agent of type i with (long, short) portfolio
position (zi
+;zi
 ) will default in period 1 in state s if and only if her income
after assets have paid o is smaller than the non-pledgeable fraction of her
endowment net of the bankruptcy costs. Let Rj(s) denote the payo in
state s of agent i's long asset portfolio with counterparty j 2 Infig. The
payo Rj(s) is taken as given by each agent, though it will be endogenously
determined, depending on the equilibrium default rate of agents of type j in
the economy.
11Given the competitive nature of the model, the bankruptcy mechanism pools all re-
payments of all agents of type i and redistributes them pro-rata to all their counterparties.
This is without loss of generality, as we concentrate on symmetric equilibria.
14Consider an agent i with a net short position zi
  > 0: She will default on
















Note that in general we allow for an agent to maintain at the same time both
short and long positions on the asset: zi
  and z
ij
+ > 0, for some j: In other
words, we assume that the clearing mechanism provided by OTC markets
does not necessarily include bilateral netting. We shall study netting later
on in the section. Let Id(z+;z ;i;s) be an indicator variable taking on value
1 if agent i with position (z+;z ) will default at equilibrium in state s, and
zero otherwise. Finally, let Ind(z+;z ;i;s) = 1   Id(z+;z ;i;s). Clearly,
Id(z+;0;i;s) = 0.
Equilibrium payos on long and short positions: Since all long posi-
tions share pro-rata the payments from defaulting and non-defaulting short






























 ) is the portfolio of agents of type j at equilibrium.
Opacity In OTC markets, there is no centralized clearing and transparency,
nor any centralized counterparty that sees all trades. Thus, the trades of each
agent i, (zi
+;zi
 ), are not observed in OTC markets by other agents.
Prices and budget constraints Long and short bilateral positions will
in general be traded at a unitary price qj, where the apex j denotes the type
of the agent in the short position. Note that the price depends on the short
agent's type j; as the type determines the agent's endowment which is public
knowledge and aects her probability of default. Importantly though, the
price is not a schedule contingent on overall trades of agent j, that is, does
not depend on her portfolio, since it is not observed.

























   0; for any j:
(12)







  = 0; for any j: (13)























denote the marginal rate of substitution between date 0 and state s at date
1 for agents of type i at equilibrium; that is, the stochastic discount factor
of agents of type i. The equilibrium price of an asset is then simply equal
to the discounted value of asset payos, where the discount rate is adjusted
for risk according to the stochastic discount factor of any agent with a long
position in the asset. More precisely, agents with a long position in the asset
are those who have the highest marginal valuation for the asset's return, and









; for any j:12 (16)
3.2 OTC markets with netting
In the OTC markets modeled in the previous section, an agent i is allowed
to go both short and long on the asset, and in equilibrium it might be that
12Alternatively, but equivalently, the equilibrium price for any j can be written as
follows: qj = E
 
miRj
; for any i s.t. z
ij






0 for any i:
16zi
  > 0 and, at the same time, z
ij
+ > 0 with some counterparty j. In this
context, an ex-post mechanism for state-by-state bilateral netting might have
welfare consequences. Hence, we also consider an economy with OTC markets
and netting so as to be able to better distinguish the welfare eects of various
distinct components of OTC and centralized market clearing mechanisms.
We model bilateral netting by requiring that agents are (without loss of





  = 0, for any j: (17)
As a consequence, an agent of type i with a short position zi
  > 0 will default










Therefore, with bilateral netting, the default decision of any agent i is inde-
pendent of zi
+, which is constrained to be equal to 0 whenever zi
  > 0. Let
the default indicator of agents of type i be now denoted as Id(z ;i;s); taking
on value 1 if agent i with short position z  will default at equilibrium in state

















and budget constraints of agents i are restricted by z
ij
+zi
  = 0, for any j:
Finally, at a competitive equilibrium of an economy with OTC markets and
netting, nancial markets clear, the consistency condition Rj(s) = Rj(z
j
 ;s)









; for any j: (20)
3.3 Centralized clearing
In the previous section, we formalized the competitive equilibrium of an econ-
omy in which nancial market trades are intermediated by an OTC market.
In this section we model instead the operation of a centralized clearing mech-
anism. We model centralized clearing mechanisms as being composed of two
fundamental functions: bilateral netting and transparency. Transparency is
obtained because a centralized clearing mechanism is assumed to aggregate
17all the information about trades and disseminate it to market participants.
Two points are in order before we proceed. One, in the model, transparency
provided by centralized clearing mechanism is coincident with submission
and execution of trades. Our equilibrium setup cannot deal with the timing
or market micro-structure issues associated with when trades are submitted
and when they are made transparent. We discuss this issue in some detail
in Section 5.2. Second, we stress that a centralized clearing mechanism need
not centrally intermediate the trades as, for instance, a centralized exchange
would do (which we discuss later).
Regarding bankruptcy resolution, we continue to assume that no creditor
has direct privileged recourse to a debtor's collateral in case of default; and
that, at equilibrium, the sum total of cash ows received by the debtor is
distributed pro-rata among the holders of long positions against the debtor.
Because of bilateral netting, an agent i with a short position zi
  > 0 will



























Because of transparency, each agent in the economy has access to detailed
information about all trades and can condition contract terms on this infor-
mation. We assume that prices are set in a competitive manner. Specically,
agents are price-takers. However, the payo on the short position of agent
j depends on the position itself, z
j
 ; and prices will in general reect such
dependence: Dierent agents will face dierent prices, reecting the prob-
ability of default implied by their characteristics: their type (e.g., level of
endowment) as well as their trading positions. This requires us to modify
the price-taking assumption for short positions in an important manner (that
is similar in spirit to modications in Acharya and Bisin, 2008, and Bisin,
Gottardi and Ruta, 2009).
Specically, an agent of type j with short position z
j
















That is, an agent of type j understands that the price it will face for a short
position depends on the total short positions it sells, z
j
 : Furthermore, an
18agent of type j understands that the price it will face for a short position
will reect a risk adjustment according to the stochastic discount factor of
the agents who would hold such a short position, that is, of those agents who
share the highest marginal valuation for the payo associated to its position,
Rj(z
j
 ): Price taking is then represented by the fact that agents take the
vector of stochastic discount factors
 
m1;:::;mi;:::;mI
as given.13 On the
other hand, regarding long positions, the payo Rj(s) is taken as given by
each agent, and so is the price qj.





























  = 0; for any j:
(24)







  = 0; for any j; (25)






















How does the competitive equilibrium under OTC markets compare in terms
of eciency properties to the competitive equilibrium under centralized clear-
ing with transparency? To answer this question, we write down the con-
strained Pareto ecient outcome as the solution to the following problem:
13Our denition of competitive price maps can be thought of as capturing the same con-
sistency condition required by Perfect Nash equilibrium in strategic environments: every
agent understands that the ask price she will face for any (possibly out-of-equilibrium)
short position z
j
  will depend on the willingness to pay of agents on the long side of the
market. In a competitive equilibrium, however, all deviations from equilibrium are nec-














































































   0, and i is the Pareto weight associated to agents of
type i.
This is the standard constrained eciency problem for a GE economy
once it is assumed that default is not controlled by the planner. The con-
straint (28) serves two purposes: (i) it restricts the planner's allocations
to those that can be achieved with the limited nancial instruments avail-
able in the economy; and (ii) it accounts for the fact that each agent can
choose to default or not, in each state s: consumption in default state s is
(1   )wi
1(s)   "zi
 , the non-pleadgeable fraction of endowment net of the
deadweight costs.14
3.5 Results
We can derive the following results on the constrained eciency of the econ-
omy with centralized clearing and transparency, in contrast to the (generic)
constrained ineciency of the economy with OTC markets.








20Proposition 1. Any competitive equilibrium of an economy with a centralized
clearing mechanism is constrained Pareto optimal.
The intuition for eciency of the economy with centralized clearing and
transparency is that each agent j that is short on the asset faces a price
qj(z
j






that is conditioned on her positions. Conse-
quently, she internalizes the eect of her default on the payo of long positions
on the asset. The observability of all trades allows for such conditioning of
prices and internalization of any externality that trading and default choices
impose on other agents. Importantly, note that an economy with a central-
ized clearing mechanism, as we have dened it, is characterized by both a
bilateral netting mechanism and transparency. Both these components are
needed for eciency.
We can show that the opacity of OTC markets induces ineciencies
through the counterparty risk externality, independently of the netting mech-
anism in place. Conversely, it can be shown that the lack of a bilateral net-
ting mechanism is associated with an externality that induces ineciencies
in equilibrium even when transparency is guaranteed.
First of all, consider an economy with OTC markets without bilateral
netting. As we noted, in this case, an agent of type i with a short position
zi
















The default decision of an agent of type i, therefore, depends on Rj(s); that is,
on agents j's default decisions, which in turn depend on i's default decisions,
introducing a netting externality at equilibrium. Then, it is the case that:
Competitive equilibria of economies with OTC markets without netting are
robustly not Pareto ecient.
The proof of this statement, however, requires some complex dierential com-
putations and is omitted. It is an adaptation of that in Bisin, Geanakoplos,
Gottardi, Minelli, and Polemarchakis (2001).
Next, in OTC markets with bilateral netting, an agent i with a short
position zi










21No netting externality arises in this case. Nevertheless, we shall show that
equilibria of an economy with OTC markets and netting are also typically
constrained inecient. In other words, the transparency provided by cen-
tralized clearing mechanism (but not provided by OTC market economies,
with or without netting) is necessary for constrained eciency.
Proposition 2. Competitive equilibria of economies with a centralized clear-
ing mechanism cannot be robustly supported as equilibria in economies with
OTC markets, with or without netting.15 More specically, any competitive
equilibrium of the economy with centralized clearing mechanism in which de-
fault occurs with positive probability cannot be supported in the economy with
OTC markets, with or without netting.
The intuition is that in OTC markets, with or without netting, each agent
j that is short on the asset faces a price qj that is not conditioned on her
position z
j
 . Consequently, she does not internalize the eect of her default
on the payo of long positions on the asset. This is a counterparty risk
externality . More generally, when the counterparty risk externality interacts
with the netting externality, it is also the case that:
Competitive equilibria of economies with OTC markets and netting are ro-
bustly not constrained Pareto ecient.16
Finally, let the leverage of agent j; Lj; be dened as the value of her short
positions' contractual payo (promised debt payment) divided by the value











Proposition 3. For deadweight costs " that are small enough, competitive
equilibria of economies with OTC markets, with or without netting, are char-
acterized by weakly greater (and robustly by strictly greater) leverage and
15Formally, by robustly we mean: for an open set of economies parametrized by agents'
endowments and preferences.
16Once again, we omit the proof of this statement to avoid some complex dierential
computations.
22default risk compared to equilibria of the same economy with a centralized
clearing mechanism.
Since ask prices in economies with OTC markets, with or without netting,
do not penalize the short positions for their own incentives to default, agents
have incentives to exceed the Pareto ecient short positions. Indeed, the
proof of these main propositions in the Appendix shows that as long as (i)
the underlying asset has some aggregate risk, its price will robustly carry a
risk premium that is positive (as explained in the example economy of Section
2), and (ii) bankruptcy costs are not too high (" is small), then agents with
endowments in the aggregate risky states have an incentive to go excessively
short. This increases the equilibrium default rate and leads to inecient
risk-sharing.17 For ecient risk-sharing, it is in general necessary to be able
to commit to future payos on nancial assets, but in OTC markets, such
commitment cannot be ensured through prices.
Opacity and counterparty risk externality When combined together,
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 imply that a centralized clearing mechanism with
transparency is an ecient response to counterparty risk externality. Our
analysis, especially in Propositions 2 and 3, makes it precise that it is the
opacity or lack of transparency of the OTC markets that leads to ex ante
ineciency in terms of excessively large short positions or leverage. In equi-
librium, agents anticipate the lowering of payo on long positions due to
counterparty risk and the price of insurance falls. However, this is not su-
cient to preclude the insurers from selling large quantities of insurance and
defaulting ex post, as the risk premiums they earn (which depend on the
ratio of price to the payo) remain unaected.
Centralized exchange economy In the Appendix, we study an economy
in which all asset trades are operated by a competitive centralized exchange.
In essence, the exchange is a centralized counterparty that observes all trades
and conditions contract terms for individual agents on these trades. In prac-
tice, this could be thought of as capturing a setting with a specialist that sees
all trades and sets price schedules, or an exchange that sees all trades and
17If " = 0, zi
  is unbounded and, strictly speaking, the economy has no equilibrium. This
is just an extreme case, which is of interest to identify the \force" towards borrowing and
default built into our model of opaque OTC markets. Positive deadweight costs, " > 0,
guarantee the existence of equilibrium.
23imposes exposure limits on traders based on their overall positions. It can be
shown that the competitive equilibrium allocations of economies with such
a centralized exchange coincide with those of economies with a centralized
clearing mechanism. Therefore, by Proposition 1, competitive equilibrium al-
locations of economies with a centralized exchange are constrained ecient.
4 Extensions
4.1 Collateral constraints
We have not yet analyzed the welfare properties of a commonly employed
risk control and policy instrument, namely bilateral collateral constraints.18
Consider our example OTC economy of Section 2 with bilateral netting in
which selling one unit of the asset short requires posting k units of the date-0
commodity as \collateral" to the counterparty. We assume that, when posted
as collateral, one unit of the date-0 commodity pays an exogenous constant
return r. To start with, we will assume r is equal to one. The collateral
is \segregated" for each counterparty in that it has privileged access to its
collateral in case of default on the contract.












a condition that provides a lower bound on the required collateral constraint
to deter default. However, not all collateral constraints are feasible for post-






which yields an upper bound on the feasible collateral constraint.
Since in our example economy, eciency is achieved when there is no
default and Rz3
ND = w3(B), eciency can be attained with a collateral
18IMF (April 2010) shows that the top ve banks and broker dealers in the United
States posted cash collateral on derivatives positions as of 1 December 2009, ranging from
15% of derivatives payables (in case of Goldman Sachs) to 50% (for Bank of America).
24constraint if and only if the lower bound above is smaller than available










where qND is the equilibrium price of insurance absent any default.
It follows then that in this example, collateral constraints can in general
achieve eciency if and only if ", the deadweight cost of bankruptcy for the
insurer, is not too small. Intuitively, the incentive to default is rather strong
when " is small, so that counteracting it requires the insurer to post high
levels of collateral; such high levels might, however, not be feasible given
insurer's limited endowment.
Put another way, collateral adds to the insurer's cost of default since it is
seized by the counterparty in case of insurer's default, but it is released for
the insurer otherwise. Thus, collateral increases the insurer's liability from
default. The extent of such increased liability is limited by insurer's ability to
post collateral in the rst place, in other words by the starting endowment.
Indeed, when " is too small, collateral constraint k that rules out default
needs to be so large that it restricts z3, as given by z3 
w3
0
(k q), to a level that
is smaller than z3
ND, limiting the extent of risk-sharing in the economy to
below ecient levels (even though insurer's default is averted). The supply
of hedging by the insurer, z3, is now decreasing in the extent of collateral
constraint, k, whereas the price of insurance, q, is rising in k (but at a rate
that is smaller than one). The insurers are rendered funding-constrained in a
bid to avoid their default but this restricts equilibrium provision of insurance
to inecient levels.
In the general economy with collateral constraint k, an agent of type i
with a short position zi

















  < (1   )w
i
1(s)   (" + k)z
i
  ; (37)
conrming that the collateral constraints aect the default choice analogously
to how the bankruptcy cost " does. In the example economy we just studied,
eciency was associated with no default, and we saw that collateral con-
straints can induce the optimal no-default pattern, provided " is suciently
large and the level of constraint k is chosen appropriately as a policy variable.
25More generally, however, controlling k, or even a type-dependent collateral
constraint ki, is not enough to induce optimal default.
To see this, recall that eciency requires in general that prices for short
sales of the asset be of the form qi(zi







: It follows then from (37) that eciency requires collat-
eral constraints that depend on the shorting agent type i and on her position
zi
 . But collateral constraints of the form ki(zi
 ) require the observability
of zi
 , that is, a centralized clearing mechanism on the part of the regulator
imposing the constraints, or the transparency of overall short positions to
counterparties setting the constraints bilaterally. By implication, collateral
constraints do not suce in OTC markets to achieve eciency of allocations.
Next, as our example illustrated, a bilateral collateral constraint in the
OTC market is limited in its eectiveness when it requires the insurer to
hold large quantities of collateral asset. We argue now that even in the case
where holding such large quantities of collateral asset is feasible, it might
not in general be possible to obtain ecient allocations if the return on
the collateral asset r is not adequately large. The key observation is that
collateral constraints can now impose a mis-allocation cost on the economy
as some agents are required to hold sub-optimal asset portfolios, specically,
a position in an asset that induces excessive consumption at date 1 for those
agents who are shorting the asset.
Formally, let zi
  > 0 denote the ecient portfolio allocation of an agent i
shorting the asset, and (xi
0 , xi
1 (s)) her consumption allocations. Let also k
denote the (minimal) collateral constraint which guarantees that agent i, has
no incentive to default in the collateral constraint economy, when she holds
the optimal portfolio zi
 . The budget constraints of agent i, in the collateral
constraint economy k, are
x
i





















It is clear then that any optimal allocation such that zi
  > 0 (and hence
xi
0 > wi
0) can be decentralized with collateral constraints only if at equi-
librium q > k, which does not necessarily have to hold. If instead q  k
the agent is constrained to consume an amount smaller or equal to her en-
dowment at date 0.19 Consider the case in which at equilibrium q > k. In




26this case, any allocation xi
0 > wi















q , for all s, the collateral constraint is costly in terms of eciency in
that it requires agent i to hold an asset whose return is dominated. Note
that if the collateral storage technology is not dominated, that is, if
R(s)
q < 1,
for some s, then the storage technology is a new asset in the economy and
welfare comparisons are not meaningful, unless we introduce storage also in
the baseline economy.
To summarize, bilateral collateral constraints by themselves cannot gener-
ally restore eciency in OTC markets, without the transparency guaranteed
by a centralized clearing mechanism:
Proposition 4. Competitive equilibria of economies with a centralized clear-
ing mechanism cannot be robustly supported as equilibria in economies with
OTC markets and collateral constraints, not even with type-dependent collat-
eral constraints.
4.2 Bankruptcy design
We now analyze environments in which a trasparent clearing mechanism co-
exists with OTC markets. In practice, trading mechanisms that require a
centralized clearing for all trades to guarantee the necessary transparency
are in some cases considered demanding. OTC markets might represent an
eective outlay to trade non-standardized nancial products. OTC markets
might also exist as a form of \regulatory arbitrage" to seek leverage outside
of centralized clearing markets.
In this case, our analysis suggests that to address excessive leverage and
the counterparty risk externality of OTC markets, a regulatory mechanism
penalizing access into OTC markets might be necessary. One such regula-
tory mechanism is a bankruptcy rule imposing seniority of centrally cleared
positions over OTC positions. Such subordination has in fact been proposed
as a possible regulatory tool in discussions at the International Monetary
Fund and Financial Stability Board (Basel) for containing contingent risks
linked to derivatives. It would seem that with such subordination, junior
OTC positions would not dilute the senior centrally cleared positions, for
27which counterparties would face appropriate incentives and risk controls.20
In the context of our example, for instance, it is easy to show that a junior
OTC market alongside a centralized clearing markets would remain inactive
at equilibrium, as all hedging opportunities are eciently exhausted by the
centralized clearing market. This is however not the case in general.
Formally, consider our general economy with a centralized clearing mech-
anism. An agent i can trade a long position of an asset with nominal payo
R(s) in state s, with counterparty j at price qj; agent j, in turn, faces a price
schedule q(z
j
 ) for observable short position z
j
  on the asset. Suppose now
that the same asset can also be shorted by agent j in OTC markets, and let
z
j;OTC
  denote such a short position. The price of the short position in OTC
markets will depend on the agent's trading position in the centralized mech-
anism, which is transparently observable, but not on her position in OTC












, respectively in the central-























The default decision of agent j, therefore, will depend on her total position in




  . Of course, at equilibrium, agents
trading long positions in OTC markets will take into account of their coun-
terparties' incentives to default. As a consequence, the equilibrium price in
OTC markets will account for the equilibrium default rate of short positions.
As in our model with only OTC markets, not surprisingly, this is cause for
ineciency: a counterparty risk externality exists within the OTC market.
It is important, however, to understand whether this externality extends to
the centralized clearing markets. That is, does an OTC market alongside a
centralized clearing market have a negative externality on an otherwise e-
cient market mechanism, even if bankruptcy law guarantees the seniority of
trades in the centralized clearing market?
We answer this question in the armative. To illustrate this answer,
consider an economy with no OTC markets (that is, with only a centralized
20Similar mechanisms are common in civil law countries, in the form of seniority rules
favoring (transparent) notarized transactions over (opaque) bilateral ones. Thanks to
Sabino Patruno for pointing this out.
28clearing market) in which an agent j who shorts the asset, at equilibrium,
does not default in state s. Consider the case, in particular, in which at
equilibrium agent j shorts the asset as much as possible, without defaulting.
Her position z
j
  is therefore determined by the default condition, that is, it










The return in state s for agents with long positions against agent j is then







= R(s)   "; if agent j defaults. Any
larger short position of agent j, than that implied by equation (39), would
induce her to default.
Suppose now that we allow agents to trade in OTC markets also and that
agent j indeed trades there to increase her short position. In this case, if the
centralized clearing market is senior in bankruptcy, then whenever agent j
defaults; her counterparties in the centralized clearing market will obtain
returns equal to R(s) ", independent of the size of her position in the OTC
markets but nonetheless lower than R(s). The opening of OTC markets,
even if junior in bankruptcy with respect to the centralized clearing market,
will impose a negative externality on the latter, as long as agent j will have
an incentive to trade in the OTC market. This is in fact the case if the price
she obtains for a short position in that market, qj;OTC(z
j
 ), is greater than ",
which occurs robustly.22
To summarize, seniority of centrally cleared positions over OTC positions
cannot generally restore eciency:
Proposition 5. Competitive equilibria of economies with a centralized clear-
ing mechanism cannot be robustly supported as equilibria in economies with
centralized clearing mechanism and OTC markets, not even when seniority
of centrally cleared positions over OTC positions in bankruptcy is imposed.
OTC markets will induce excessive leverage and higher probability of
default in equilibrium with respect to the equilibrium in the economy with
21Note that this equilibrium conguration is robust as the price map at equilibrium
qj(z
j





 ) is not the equilibrium price of the economy with both centralized
clearing markets and OTC markets but rather the price at the equilibrium of the economy
with no OTC markets, that is, the maximal marginal valuation across counterparties of
agent j's short position in OTC.
29only a centralized clearing mechanism. By trading in OTC markets, agents
do impose an externality on the counterparties of their positions on both the
OTC markets themselves as well as the centralized clearing mechanism, and
equilibria will be inecient. Of course, in practice, this form of ineciency
of OTC markets needs to be traded o with the eciency gain due to the
creation of OTC markets with non-standardized nancial products, a feature
not accounted for in our model.
4.3 Production risk







s in each state s 2 S; has been kept constant. We showed
that with regard to assets that insure bad aggregate states, the presence of an
equilibrium risk premium in the price creates incentives for insurers to take
on excessively short positions and default ex post. This eect can in fact
arise even in the absence of aggregate risk in initial endowments if we allow
for production in the economy and consider assets that help insure the risk
of production. The \hedging premium" on such assets then serves the same
purpose as the risk premium on assets insuring aggregate risk of exogenously
given endowments.
Suppose each agent is endowed with a production function f which trans-
forms consumption goods at time 0 into consumption goods at time 1: More










A denote a capi-
tal allocation vector over A activities (e.g., projects), so that k1+k2+:::kA =
k: The production function can then be dened as the output in state s given
capital allocation K: f(s;K);8s.23 Note that, by allowing for multiple tech-
nological activities (A  2); this formulation allows for some control of the
agents over the distribution of capital across activities and hence over the
probability distribution of outcomes, that is, over production risk.24
In this extension, the equilibrium analysis of centralized clearing and
OTC economies can be extended to production. For instance, the budget
23We assume f is continuously dierentiable, strongly increasing, and strictly quasi-
concave.
24While, for simplicity, we restrict to an economy with \backyard production" on the
part of agents, the analysis directly extends to a rm-level production economy.






























  = 0 for any
j, as well as a non-negative capital allocation Ki: Budget constraints in the
OTC economies are similarly formulated.
It can be shown (proofs available upon request) that in the production
economy, (1) A centralized clearing mechanism with transparency continues
to decentralize constrained Pareto ecient allocations; and (2) The generic
ineciency due to opacity of OTC markets manifests itself as excessive short-
ing of assets that help hedge production risk, which in equilibrium leads to
deadweight costs from default of providers of these hedges.
An example of this inecient risk-taking is the possible eect of credit
default swaps sold by A.I.G. to a large number of nancial rms in the United
States and the Europe, eectively insuring the tail risk of corporate bond
and loan portfolios and mortgage-backed securities, which was tantamount
to selling insurance on assets \produced" by the banking sector.25
To see this in a transparent manner, we revisit our example economy
of Section 2. We suppress agent 2 and suppose that w1(G) = w3(B), so
that there is no aggregate risk in starting endowments. But we suppose that
agents 1 have access to a production technology, e.g., making mortgages, that
yields per unit of investment f(G) in the good state and f(B) in the bad state,
where the investment contains aggregate risk in that f(G) > f(B). We dene
average cash ow produced per unit of investment as f = pf(G)+(1 p)f(B).
Then denoting the level of investment as k, and the cost of investment as
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25If we cleared the market for the produced assets, e.g., housing stock, then our model
could potentially generate a (housing) \bubble."
31Then, for a given level of insurance z1, the rst-order condition for agent 1's
investment decision implies that
c
0(k) = f   p(1   p)[f(G)   f(B)]

w





Intuitively, the investment is more attractive the greater is its average return
(f), the lower is its risk (p(1   p)[f(G)   f(B)])), and greater is the extent
of insurance and its quality (R+z1) since insurance lowers the attendant risk
of the investment.












where p is now the hedging premium in the price of the asset, dened as
in Section 2 as
 q
R+   (1   p)

.
Assuming the investment is indeed positive net present value, the avail-
ability of insurance for the producers is desirable up to an extent. Hedging
with such insurance reduces risk of the producer (agent 1) and facilitates
greater investment in the economy. However, as is clear from the above max-
imization problem, agent 1 does not take account of the fact that in case
insurance is associated with default of the insurer (agent 3), there may be
deadweight costs (z3 whenever z3 > w3(B)) to facilitating production in the
economy in this manner. On the other side, the insurer is unable to commit
not to default given the attraction of collecting hedging premium upfront
and defaulting on the insurance ex post.
If we let c(k) = 1




[ + p(1   p)[f(G)   f(B)]]
;
and the hedging premium is
p =
p(1   p)f [f(G)   f(B)]
 + (1   p)[f(G)   f(B)]
2 :
Interestingly, equilibrium R+ satises the same expression as in the solution
of the example economy in Section 2 (given p). And unsurprisingly, we
again obtain that there is ineciency due to counterparty risk externality
and deadweight default costs whenever " is suciently small.
32As explained in the last remarks of Section 2, default should be restricted,
and if it be Pareto ecient, even eliminated. Doing so would restrict leverage
in the economy and ensure productive eciency in that investments take ac-
count of deadweight costs involved in potential default on hedging contracts.
It also follows then that centralized clearing with transparency can again
achieve constrained eciency in the production economy.
5 Discussion
5.1 Strategic default and bankruptcy costs
A central feature of our modeling technology is the strategic nature of de-
fault { sell insurance today and default tomorrow { and the ex-post costs
associated with such a default. It is useful to interpret this feature in view
of the practical settings in which nancial rms trade. Again, the example
with A.I.G. as the protagonist is useful.
A.I.G. had traders (specically, at A.I.G. Financial Products) who were
engaged in the business of selling insurance through synthetic credit default
swaps on portfolios of mortgages and corporate loans. It seems with the
benet of hindsight that their incentive to sell a large quantity of such swaps
was (as in the model) to collect premiums upfront and get paid salaries and
bonuses based on these premiums. The result was a highly levered bet of
A.I.G. on the tail risk of the economy, that is, the likelihood of default of
A.I.G. in the case where aggregate risk materialized was rather large. Indeed,
A.I.G. as an enterprise itself suered the substantial costs of the resulting
default on these swaps.
These costs can be interpreted as z3 in our example economy. Due to
limited liability, these costs were not borne by traders at A.I.G.FP who sold
the swaps but in fact were borne by the rest of A.I.G.'s businesses (such as
life and property insurance) whose franchise value was at least in part being
deployed to pay o A.I.G.'s (non bailed-out) positions. In other words, the
traders' perception of  was small from their private standpoint, giving rise
to the incentives to default.
This suggests that one mechanism to deal with counterparty risk ex-
ternality is to raise , or in other words, weaken the incentives to default
by increasing the bankruptcy costs suered by defaulting nancial rms,
e.g., by arranging tougher resolution of their nancial distress and requiring
33co-investments from signicant risk-takers. To the extent that such penal-
ties are restricted by limited liability, our analysis highlights that improving
trading infrastructure of markets can play an important complementary role
in regulatory design to contain excessive leverage. Also, there is the time-
consistency problem which is that ex post, that is, once default has realized,
it is in society's interest to lower the bankruptcy costs, for instance, through
regulatory forbearance towards the defaulting entity. This would, however,
only lower the perceived , aggravate the strategic incentives to default, and
raise ex-ante leverage, in what can be interpreted as a form of too-big-to-fail
or too-interconnected-to-fail problem (as arose with A.I.G.FP).
5.2 Implementing centralized clearing
Our model highlights that the crucial aspect of centralized clearing and trans-
parency is that agents can condition the terms of the contracts they trade
on the total nancial position of the counterparty and not just on bilateral
positions. This is a natural reduced-form trading mechanism in the context
of competitive equilibrium modeling we adopted. The issue of its implemen-
tation in actual nancial markets remains open, especially considering that
nancial positions in practice are contracted sequentially.
What is required to implement competitive pricing and centralized clear-
ing with transparency is a trading mechanism that allows prices and other
contractual terms to adjust continuously with each agent's total position.
Such a mechanism could look much like a margin or collateral arrangement.
However, currently such arrangements are based on mark-to-market valua-
tion of positions and an overall assessment of counterparty risk (e.g., through
a credit rating). Hence, they are not exactly equivalent to continuously ob-
serving each agent's total position and conditioning price on that information.
In particular, such arrangements cannot preclude institutions from positions
beyond a certain size, that is, cannot implement non-linear pricing schedules
- or \position limits" - as often employed on clearinghouses and exchanges.
To allow conditioning of trades on overall positions of a counterparty,
post-trade transparency - in which trades are conducted during the day,
reconciled and registered with a centralized clearing agency at the end of
the day, and transparency provided to market participants on these trades
thereafter - is necessary. However, if economic behavior of institutions is
not stationary, then even pre-trade transparency may be necessary because
in absence of information about trades an institution plans to undertake, it
34is not possible for counterparties to charge an appropriate pricing schedule.
Needless to say, such pre-trade transparency may be perceived to be too
intrusive in some markets, which may thus continue to remain OTC.
An alternative approach in such cases, as we examined, would be to
specify a bankruptcy rule whereby centrally cleared positions have seniority
over OTC positions. While not perfect, as we discussed, it can help partly
ameliorate the counterparty risk externality of OTC markets.
Finally, some recent changes in OTC markets, especially in contract terms
of standardized credit default swaps (the so-called \Big Bang" protocol laid
out in April 2009), require counterparties to exchange a part of their ex-
changed risk in pre-funded terms. This eectively amounts to requiring a
high upfront or initial margin from the short position, or in other words, to
reducing the leverage that can be built through a short position. As we have
argued, such collateral requirements may be desirable if there are limitations
to implementing centralized clearing, transparency or central counterparties,
but they may be harmful in terms of limiting risk-sharing if they are designed
to be too steep.
5.3 Proposals to reform the OTC markets
The nancial crisis of 2007-09 has led to several reform proposals for OTC
markets.26 Our theoretical analysis can help provide a normative framework
for evaluation of these proposals.
Acharya, Engle, Figlewski, Lynch and Subrahmanyam (2009) divide the
reform proposals into requiring a (i) centralized registry with no disclosure
to market participants; (ii) centralized clearing with disclosure of aggregate
trade information to market participants; and (iii) centralized counterparty
or exchange with full public disclosure of prices and volumes. Our theoretical
analysis makes it clear that a centralized registry by itself is not sucient
as it only gives regulators ex-post access to trade-level information but does
not counteract the ex-ante moral hazard of institutions wanting to take on
excessive leverage. Both centralized clearing and exchange improve on this
ground but it is transparency that is crucial. In our model, it is sucient
that centralized clearing disseminates trade positions to market participants
and they themselves set price schedules and risk controls conditional on that
26See Stulz (2009) for a summary of the dimensions along which OTC markets for credit
derivatives likely contributed, and did not contribute, to the crisis.
35information. In particular, requiring all trades to take place through a cen-
tralized exchange is not necessary though in that case there would be no need
to disclose information on all trades to individual agents.
Regulatory reforms under the Dodd-Frank Act (July 2010) in the United
States, and similar reform proposals in the U.K. and the Europe, require
that mature and standardized derivatives such as the plain vanilla interest
rate derivatives and single-name and index credit default swaps (CDS) be
centrally cleared; there is no proposal to mandate that these be traded on
an exchange. Complex products will continue to trade in OTC markets.
Regulators will gain unfettered access to information on prices, volumes and
exposures for all contracts, but the proposals do not require that exposure-
level information be made public, not even with a delay.While some aggregate
information will be disseminated to all market participants, such as the recent
data published by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC)
on all live positions in credit derivatives, full transparency of positions of a
given counterparty is being required only for regulatory usage.
Our results suggest that these proposed changes are unlikely to be fully
adequate, though they take some steps in the right direction. Importantly,
without exposure-level transparency for markets at large, counterparties can-
not adopt \position limit" style restrictions. While centralized clearing plat-
forms could impose such limits on standardized products, for OTC markets
the onus would be on regulators to get capital and collateral requirements
\right". Besides the limits on regulatory capacity to do so for complex prod-
ucts, a purely collateral-based approach { as we have argued { may be ex-
cessively costly in terms of locking up economy's resources. Exposure-level
transparency to markets might be a cheaper alternative, in our view. How-
ever, if such transparency requirements should be seen as too restrictive, per-
haps because they would limit generation of proprietary information which
is costly to acquire, then there may be a role for seniority rule in bankruptcy
in favor of centrally cleared positions over OTC positions. This would partly,
but not fully, address the counterparty risk externality due the OTC posi-
tions.
6 Related Literature
The bilateral nature of contracts in the OTC markets has been stressed in the
recent literature on the subject. Due, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005, 2007)
36focus on search frictions, dynamic bargaining and valuation in OTC markets;
Caballero and Simsek (2009) analyze the role of complexity introduced by
bilateral connections and their role in causing nancial panics and crises; and,
Golosov, Lorenzoni, and Tsyvinski (2009) examine what kind of bilateral
contracts will get formed when agents have private information about their
endowment shocks. Our paper, while focused on OTC markets, is concerned
primarily with issues of opacity and resulting ineciencies.
The literature on insurance provision through nancial contracts (e.g.,
Duee and Zhou, 2001, Acharya and Johnson, 2007, Parlour and Winton,
2008) has largely focused on moral hazard on part of the insured due to the
presence of information frictions. In contrast, our paper is concerned with
moral hazard on part of the insurer, and how OTC markets contribute to
it. Some of these aspects feature in the work of Allen and Carletti (2006),
Thompson (2009) and Zawadowski (2009).
Allen and Carletti (2006) consider contagion from the insurance sector to
the nancial sector when there is credit risk transfer, but they do not consider
agency-theoretic issues. In contrast, we allow for default incentives of the
insurer and model credit risk transfer more generally as risk-sharing through
nancial contracts in a GE setting. Zawadowski (2009) analyzes counterparty
risk in entangled nancial systems. The system is \entangled' because banks
hedge risks using bilateral OTC contracts but do not internalize the cost of
their own failure on other banks (through counterparty risk exposures). As a
result of this network externality, banks purchase less insurance against low
probability events. Thus, there is less insurance in his model whereas due to
moral hazard on part of the insurer, there is in fact excessive insurance in our
setup but it is of low quality and entails default by the insurer. Thompson
(2009) considers the moral hazard of default on part of the insurer when
there is credit risk transfer in the nancial sector. His focus is on analyzing
how this moral hazard provides incentives to the insured parties to reveal
information about their type, so that the two agency problems interact and
reduce each others' adversity. Our paper, in contrast, is concerned with
opacity of the insurers' positions.
More specically on the benets of OTC versus centralized markets, our
analysis did not consider practical issues relating to the extent of netting of
positions that is possible under dierent market structures. Due and Zhu
(2009) explain that for a centralized counterparty to reduce counterparty
risk more than in one OTC products setting, it would require netting across
a large number other products. In our model, the primary role of the cen-
37tralized clearing mechanism or centralized counterparty is not necessarily to
reduce or eliminate counterparty risk but to improve its price by aggregating
information on trades. We conjecture that if there were a centralized registry
of all positions that is observed by dierent clearing platforms or exchanges
and disseminated to market participants, then the pricing would be ecient
ex ante, and so would be the levels of ex-post default risk. This is related
to Leitner (2009)'s result that a clearinghouse-style mechanism, by allowing
each party to declare its trades and revealing publicly those that hit pre-
specied position limits, can prevent agents from promising the same asset
to multiple counterparties and then defaulting.
From a pedagogical standpoint, our primary contribution lies in a formal
modeling and analysis of opacity in OTC markets. We considered compet-
itive equilibria of economies with moral hazard, where the moral hazard is
induced by the opacity of agents' positions and their strategic default de-
cisions. In the terminology of existing literature, we compared competitive
equilibria in exclusive contractual environments to competitive equilibria in
non-exclusive contractual environments. Exclusive contractual environments
are by denition those in which one party in a contractual relationship can
constrain all of the counterparty's trades with third parties. Therefore, in
exclusive contractual environments counterparty risks play no role, as in our
economies with a centralized clearing mechanism or with a centralized ex-
change. In non-exclusive contractual environments, on the contrary, agents
cannot be restricted from engaging in multilateral contractual obligations
which are not observable by the counterparties, as in the OTC markets.27
We focused on symmetric information about states of the world in our
analysis. However, there could be adverse selection, e.g., in the form of
unobservable probability distributions over S, the uncertain state at date 1:
Modeling adverse selection in our setup would require combining features of
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Akerlof (1970).28 We conjecture that there
27The distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive contracts is central in the theory
of competitive economies with moral hazard; see e.g., Bisin and Gottardi (1999) and Bisin,
Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli and Polemarchakis (2001). In the context of principal
agent models, see the early work of Arnott and Stiglitz (1993) and Hellwig (1983). In
nance, several papers have exploited the distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive
markets in dierent contexts: e.g., Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) in a sequential model of
banking, Parlour and Rajan (2001) in a model of credit card loans, and Bisin and Rampini
(2006) in a model of bankruptcy.
28Santos and Scheinkman (2001) have adverse selection as well in their model of com-
petition of exchanges.
38would be separating equilibria in the economy with centralized clearing or
exchanges, and excessive lemons trading (in the form of risky short positions)
in the case of OTC markets. In turn, we conjecture that the ineciency of
OTC markets will be exacerbated in a setting with adverse selection.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we formalized an important market failure arising due to opac-
ity of over-the-counter (OTC) markets, in particular that the payo on each
position depends in default on other positions sold by the defaulting party,
but there is no way for market participants to condition their trades or prices
based on knowledge of these other positions. We showed that this counter-
party risk externality can lead to excessive default and production of aggre-
gate risk, and more generally, inecient risk-sharing. Centralized clearing,
by enabling transparency of trades, and exchanges, by creating a centralized
counterparty to all trades, can help agents fully internalize the counterparty
risk externality. Our model provides one explanation { based on incentives
to excessively sell short, collect risk premiums and default ex post { for the
substantial buildup of OTC positions in credit default swaps in the period
leading up to the crisis of 2007-09. The model also helps understand the
likely contribution of OTC trading to over-extension of credit in the econ-
omy, and eectiveness of proposed remedies for limiting this excess such as
position-level transparency, centralized clearing or counterparty, collateral
requirements, and subordination of OTC claims relative to centrally cleared
ones.
Several extensions of our basic setup are worthy of detailed modeling in
future. One, we focused on competitive markets. It is interesting to consider
bilateral OTC markets in the presence of a \large" individual agent that
eectively observes the trades of all others but whose trades are not seen by
others. Such an agent would enjoy monopoly rents in the OTC setting, which
in turn would reduce private incentives in the economy to coordinate on a
transparent, centralized trading platform and achieve Pareto improvement.
Second, our model suggests that excessive leverage and excessive production
arising due to the OTC nature of trading can lead to a \bubble" in the market
for goods (e.g., the housing stock), a subsequent crash upon realization of
adverse shocks, and a breakdown of risk transfer (credit or insurance markets)
in those states. Finally, our analysis also suggests that the possibility of
39regulatory forbearance of \too big to fail" positions can result in ex-ante
ineciencies even with transparency and centralized exchange trading.
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42Appendix
Centralized exchange economy. To model a centralized exchange econ-
omy, we continue to assume that no creditor has direct privileged recourse to
a debtor's endowment, in case of default. The centralized exchange, on the
other hand, has full recourse to the debtors' pledgeable endowment. Further-
more, the exchange operates as a bankruptcy mechanism, by distributing the
cash ow of the short positions pro-rata with respect to the long positions.
An agent i, taking a long position z
ij
+ > 0 with short counterparty j; takes
the return Rj as well as the price qj as given. The equilibrium payo of the
asset shorted by agent j, denoted Rj(z
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Consequently, an agent of type j with short position z
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Price taking is represented by the fact that agents take the pricing kernels  
m1;:::;mi;:::;mI
as given.
We turn next to the decision problem of the competitive centralized ex-
change, which controls the supply of the asset to agents. Let the supply













  = 0 for any j.29
Then, given the supplies, the exchange can compute the cash ow of the
























taking as given the stochastic discount factor of the agent i who values it
the most at the margin, that is the agent who would acquire it if oered.




. Crucially, the exchange anticipates the
29By construction, ii
+ = 0:
43compositional eects on default risk of portfolios of dierent agent types,
that is, it recognizes how each agent i's incentives to default are aected by
her positions (i
+;i

































  = 0, for any j: (45)
At competitive equilibrium, the portfolios demanded by the agents are









 ; 8i;j ; (46)
and the price maps and returns anticipated by agents are consistent with



































It is straightforward to show (proof available upon request) that the com-
petitive equilibrium allocations of economies with such a centralized exchange
coincide with those of economies with a centralized clearing mechanism.
Therefore, by Proposition 1, competitive equilibrium allocations of economies
with a centralized exchange are constrained ecient. Note however that a
centralized exchange which intermediates all nancial market trades may for
some products be a much more invasive institution than a centralized clear-
ing mechanism which allows trading to remain decentralized but requires all
trades to be registered and made transparent to market participants.


















denote a constrained Pareto optimal allocation
which dominates the equilibrium allocation. Assume that both allocations








































































































































































































Proof of Proposition 2. We only prove the statement regarding economies
with OTC markets and netting. The proof in the case of OTC markets with-
out netting only requires straightforward modications. We restrict attention
to the case when " is small so that there is default in the economy. Further-
more, assume to start with that " = 0. Let (zi
+;zi
 ) be the equilibrium
portfolio for agent i in an economy with centralized clearing mechanism. Let
S(i)  S denote the subset of the states of uncertainty in which, at equilib-
rium, an agent i will default. Then, S(i) is robustly non-empty. Furthermore,
45if S(i) is non-empty, then zi
  > 0. For any economy such that S(i) is non-
empty (and zi
  > 0) for some i, at equilibrium of the centralized clearing

















Suppose, by contradiction, that such a competitive equilibrium of the central-
ized exchange economy can be supported in an economy with OTC markets









psmi(s)R(s); such that qi = qi(zi
 ) at the equilibrium portfolio (zi
+;zi
 ):
It is straightforward to see that in this case, at price qi agent i prefers a
portfolio (zi
+;zi
  + dz); for some dz > 0: This is because the marginal val-








psmi(s)R(s), depends negatively on zi
 ; while
the price obtained at time 0 from the same unitary extra short portfolio, dz,
qi; does not. Since the portfolio (zi
+;zi
  + dz) is budget feasible, a contra-
diction is reached. This is the case for any equilibrium of the centralized
exchange economy such that S(i) is non-empty, for some i, and hence the
contradiction holds robustly.
The proof extends by continuity to " suciently small. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Once again, we only prove the statement re-
garding economies with OTC markets and netting. The proof in the case of
OTC markets without netting only requires straightforward modications.
Once again, assume " = 0 and the proof below extends by continuity to
" suciently small. Finally, the \weakly greater" part of the statement is
straightforward. We turn to prove the robustly \strictly greater" part.
Consider the robust subset of economies for which, with centralized clear-
ing at equilibrium, S(i) is non-empty. An argument analogous to the one in
the proof of Proposition 2 guarantees that, for these economies, when " is
small enough, at an equilibrium of the economy with OTC markets and net-
ting, S(i) = S: Agents i; in other words, default in all states s 2 S: This
proves that default is robustly strictly greater at equilibria of the economy
with OTC markets and netting than with centralized clearing.
Consider such an equilibrium with OTC markets and netting, to study
leverage. Consider now the general case in which " > 0: At equilibrium it
46must be that qi > 0: Suppose on the contrary that qi  0. In this case,
we claim agents i would rather choose zi
  = 0 and hence would trivially not






































By resorting to autarchy, zi
  = z
ij












which they prefer. Prices such that qi  0 therefore imply no default. This
is the case for all agents of all types i. But then R+(s) = R(s), for all s 2 S
and z
ji
+ is robustly > 0; for some j, a contradiction with market clearing. At
an equilibrium of the economy with OTC markets and netting, therefore, it
must be that qi > 0: In this case zi
  grows unbounded as " ! 0. This proves
that leverage is robustly strictly greater in the economy with OTC markets
and netting than with centralized exchange for " small enough. 
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